Back down effort structure for interethnic savagery changes in Kenya
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Abstract

A critical look at the Africa, it is clear that the continent has experienced a lot of conflicts and civil wars. The magnitudes of conflicts have certainly divided the continent within ethnic, cultural, political, social and economical dimensions. It becomes clear that designing a campaign advocacy for inter-ethnic non-violent reforms of peace-building is of paramount importance towards developing social transformation in changing people’s worldviews. It is evident that human identity needs are linked to worldview or the worlds people construct for themselves based on their culture and language; where these factors provide both a common framework for people and a way of seeing and creatively acting in the world. This article seeks to critically explore the assumption that, existence of inter-ethnic violence in Kenya and tribal hatred in a nation is an indicator of lack of a core national character and value element. The methodologies and tactics discussed have effectively or potentially been effective in resolving conflict non-violently in many cases within Africa, Asia, and the Western World. The primary objective of this article is to explore these methodologies of peace-building based on Socio-cultural norms, values and expectations that constitutes to key determinants for the way a society approaches conflict of inter-ethnic violence, as well as for the processes considered acceptable/desirable for conflict transformation. In other words, the focus of the article is not only on the process of these interventions, but also on their outcome based on the context, content and the process. While there is a lack of more comprehensive theoretical frameworks for inter-ethnic violence reforms in Kenya, this article tries to fill the gap by presenting advocacy campaign that influence change by targeting primary stakeholders involved, groups to include in the movement for change, those likely to resist change, sources of power, and the dependency balance. Finally, the article points out considerable measures for achieving sustainable change through peace-building framework and theory of change.

Keywords: Non-violence, inter-ethnic, peace-keeping, conflict transformation.

INTRODUCTION

Kenya, once peaceful a country along the East Africa coast and well known for its beautiful touristic sites has just experienced the most terrible violence in her history since independence from Britain in 1963. Though the disputed election results announced on the 30th of December 2007 are regarded as the immediate cause of the recent crisis, there are many root causes. A scramble for land is one of the root causes for the inter-ethnic violence in Kenya. The land question goes back to the British colonial rule when the colonial government removed na-tives from their ancestral land and made the land available to British settlers.

Although the different ethnic groups co-existed peacefully for decades, inter-ethnic violence erupted in 1992 at the time of the first multi-party General Elections in the country. This violence of 1992 was the strongest indication yet that there was a latent land conflict that could erupt any time (Wangare, 2008). The aim of this article is to design a proposal for launching an advocacy campaign for intervening in inter-ethnic violence reforms in Kenya. Why is it important to intervene now if the land conflicts have been going on for decades? The recent disputes over the election results have put the issue of land and ethnicity back into the mainstream of Kenyan national agenda. Every Kenyan is talking about how historical land injustice was a major contributory factor for the escalation of the election crisis and division among different ethnic tribes. Therefore, unless civil society put pressure on the political leaders, the land issues and ethnic violence will be forgotten once again. It is only a
sustained campaign that will turn the attention of the political leaders to the root cause of the political crisis.

Problem statement

At the time of independence in 1963, the Government of Kenya identified illiteracy, disease, ignorance and poverty as the main problems to be addressed in the post-independence era. In spite of the antipoverty measures implemented since independence, 56% of the Kenyan population today remains poor (KIPPRA, 2004). Further, despite the numerous studies on poverty measurement and profiles in Kenya, little is known about the relationship between poverty, corruption and the lack of a unifying value system that inculcates a culture of accountability, responsibility, integrity and vision in the leadership and citizenry for the progress and achievement of better relationships among ethnic groups in Kenya. However, to a larger or lesser extent, few studies have been done on the peaceful co-existence of the 42 tribes in Kenya to underscore the proximate and historical causes of interethnic violence reforms.

Over its long history, Kenya has always been known to be a sanctuary of peace and receiving refugees from other countries of Great Lakes region. It never occurred that at one time Kenya could be classified in the same category with countries like: Ivory Coast, Iraq, Somalia, Uganda, DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Somalia, to mention a few. However, from the onset of colonization, the latent inter-ethnic divisions among different tribes have been part and parcel of proximate and historical causes of violence. In 1963, Kenya became an independent nation state. It was established as a single state, ethnically divided between 42 tribes, shaped by subsistence farming or herding or a mixture of both. The indigenous Kenyans form 98% of the population and fall into three major cultural and linguistic groups: Bantu, Nilotes and Cushites. According to Wikipedia, the term Bantu - means "people" in many Bantu languages, along with similar sounding cognates. The noun root -ntu is found in nouns such as umuntu (person), abantu (people), ubun-tu (quality of being human, humaneness), and verbs and adjectives describing the nouns agree with them: Umuntu omkulu uhamba ngokushesha (The big person walks quickly), Abantu abakhiru bahamba ngokushesha (The big people walk quickly). Nilotic groups refers to ethnic groups mainly in southern Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and northern Tanzania, who speak Nilotic languages, a large sub-group of the Nilo-Saharan languages. These include the Kalenjin, Luo, Ateker, Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Maa-speaking peoples – all which are clusters of several ethnic groups. Similarly, the term Nilotic is used to distinguish "Nilotic people" from their ethnic neighbours (mainly Bantu speaking people), based on ethnonymic affiliation. And lastly, Cushites refers to a branch of the Afro-Asiatic family of languages including about 30 languages spoken in areas of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.

Although most of the land area is occupied by Cushitic and Nilotic peoples, over 70% of the population is Bantu. Other Nilotes groups are: Luo, Turkana, Maasai, Pokot, Nandi, Kipsigis, and Tugen which occupy a broad area in the west from Lake Rudolf to the Tanzania border. Cushites such as; the Galla and Somali live in the eastern and Northeastern parts of the country. The Bantu reside mainly in the coastal areas and the Southwestern uplands; the most significant Bantu peoples are the Kikuyu, Kamba, and Luhya whilst the most significant Nilotes are: Luo, Nandi, and Maasai. The Kikuyu, who constitute the largest single ethnic group in Kenya, live for the most part north of Nairobi and occupy Central Kenya as a whole with others spread all over the country. The estimated proportions of the major groups are Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, and Meru 6%.

Other Africans constitute 15% of the total population. The European community which has rebounded since the 1960s is primarily of British origin. About 12% of the Europeans hold Kenyan citizenship. A 1984 law provides that people born in Kenya of non-Kenyan parents can claim Kenyan citizenship. Likewise, the Kenyan law also requires that each person must obtain national identity card at the age of 18 and above. From the information provided in the identity card, one can easily locate each person’s ethnic group that emerges in a dynamic relationship to the state. This practice has been indeed grounded in people’s culture and identity in terms of naming system and individual background. Avruch (2003) stressed that ethnicity, race, or nationality is conflated with culture. This is to say, ethnic conflict for example is primarily a cultural conflict of social identity and solutions can be sought on cultural realm. In Kenya therefore, the most influential use of ethnic violence in recent decades has been of latent political revolutions created by the colonial admini-stration of unresolved land issues, unequal distribution of national resources, marginalization, and exclusion of other tribes in the political scenario to mention a few. Not surprisingly to mention, food, identity, and the land grab-bing forms the basis of ethnic conflict in Kenya in view of the acquisition and transmission of group membership of common descent. We must understand however that as Black (2003) pointed out that people who together ate food produced from a particular piece of land were known to share a common essence, a common being. This is what made the people of a given place (district or valley or island) the same. The surprising insight here is that survival requires the horizon of hope coupled with indifference toward the impact of violence. The Kenyans situation for instance, has been surrounded with porousness of political identity and group boundaries created by the colonies that form the root causes of interethnic division and violence.

In particular, the history of Kenya’s land can be traced back to 1915 when under British colonial rule, crown land, which was distinct from land reserved for African
Customary Tenure, was placed under the authority of the Governor. The latter also appointed, a Commissioner of land who was responsible for overseeing and distributing land to the British settlers through a Public auction system. By 1940 the British established a new system whereby the Land commissioner together with a local land committee allotted residential land to individuals on the basis of ability to pay within 30 days. The land was sold at 20% of the market value of the land to encourage development. This practice was later abused by politicians who illegally granted land to people for political reasons (Southall, 2005).

Land in Kenya can be divided into three categories; Government land, Trust land, and Private land. The Government land can be sub divided into land which has been leased to public institutions or private individuals by the government of Kenya, and land that has not been leased or allocated but has been set aside for public purpose. Trust land is land that is held in trust by District councils on behalf of local communities. Private land is land that is registered in the name of an individual or a private company. It is the Government land and Trust land that has been illegally abused and distributed by former Presidents Kenyatta and Moi for political reasons. District council officials, officials in the land commission office have also been involved in illegally distributing land for political reasons (Southall, 2005).

Following the newly elected Government of National Rainbow Coalition in 2003 under the leadership of President Kibaki, a Commission was instituted and charged with the responsibility of inquiring into the unlawful allocation of public land and to ascertain who the beneficiaries were. However, the findings found were scandalous. Cabinet ministers like Professor George Saitoti, Uhuru Kenyatta and his mother, (the former first lady Mama Ngina), the Prime Minister Raila Odinga and his brother Oburu Odinga were mentioned in the land report as beneficiaries of public land grabbing (Savula and Namwaya, 2004; Okwembah and Mwangi, 2004). Similarly, religious organizations including Catholic and Anglican institutions also benefited from the illegal allocation of land in Kenya. The losers in the illegal land distribution of land are the ordinary citizens in Kenya who are not connected to powerful politicians. It is on their behalf and with them that this campaign is going to be launched to channel peaceful campaign advocacy and interethnic violence reforms.

Problem subject analysis

Therefore, the aim of this article is to design a proposal for launching an advocacy campaign for intervening in the Inter-ethnic Violence Reforms in Kenya. In doing so, the study would be guided by the following questions: Who are the key stakeholders involved? Who are the possible groups to include in a movement for change? Who are likely to resist change? What are the sources of power of each of the stakeholders? What are the interests of each of the key stakeholders? What is the dependency balance between groups and how they depend on each other? How does this relate to consent theory? At the end, we will look into a crystal ball of reforms to see what future bring by designing a campaign and proposal of some recommendations and conclusions against interethnic violence reforms paradigms.

In Kenya, the inter-ethnic violence struggles begun after post colonial governments were formed. While the first cabinet was quite representative of the face of Kenya, soon ideological difference, impact of cold war and betrayal on key issues cropped in, thus dividing the original personalities in the independence struggle; hence some tribes were sidelined and politics of exclusion and elimination begun with earnest, sometimes combined with assassinations. During Kenyatta, electoral politics never took shape in a democratic sense since he ruled mainly through the provincial administration, outside the Kenya African National Union (KANU) framework, rendered the party system that could have rallied the people around issues and programmes meaningless.

As a result of political exclusion and ideological differences, fears of ethnic ascendancies, power- hungry ethnic political elites, undemocratic processes and institution, which are all hallmarks of today’s Kenya interethnic violence begun to play out; a confirmation of the undemocratic historical trajectory that Kenya has been moving along ethnic lines from time memorial. For example, the escalation of 2007 election violence exposed the deliberate attachment of ethnic tension by power-hungry elites, feeble democratic traditions, and institutions in Kenya, one that threatens to consume it if not adequately addressed with its root causes traced based on ethnic lines. When these events of ethnic enmity are repeated over and over again, across decades and generations, it creates conflict of interest and survival. The reason Black (2003) points out that ethnicity emerged from common sense know ledge, everyday ideas about the acquisition and sharing of identity and selfhood. It is within this perspective that I believe sustainable campaign and advocacy will turn the attention of the leader’s common sense by analysing the root causes of the problem and coming up with a clear frameworks and tactics for reforms. As a peace- building practitioner, I am proposing a national campaign, interna tional support, and civil society advocacy for interethic violence reforms in Kenya that could apply to other countries as well with different forms of ethnic and racial violence.

Stakeholders of Interethnic Violence Reforms in Kenya

Rubenstein (2003) argues that the potential for conflict exists whenever individuals or groups pursue goals that they perceive to be incompatible. In the case of Kenya for instance, in the late 19th century most of the people of Kenya resisted British conquest and land grabbing when white settlements began to settle in the fertile highlands of Rift Valley from central and western province by displacing the indigenous people hoping to get equal...
share. Unfortunately, this has not been the case for many indigenous Kenyans in terms of equal distribution of land resources, appointments to senior position in the government and employment. These mode of grabbing land, unequal distribution, and poor leadership are part of the strong administrative structures designed up to date that have been effectively been used as part of state machinery to impose illegitimate authority on the people from other ethnic groups. Besides, new land redistribution scheme which was introduced under Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 followed by other constitutional changes schemes did not adequately address the land question and ethnic hostilities. To touch the ground, the first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu by tribe, encouraged Kikuyus to settle on fertile land in the Rift Valley which had been given up by White settlers displacing the indigenous who belongs to Kalenjin and other Nilotic groups. This however created latent conflict between the communities that latter led to interethnic violence and land clashes witnessed most often during and after elections. After independence, all ethnic groups felt to have a stake in the running of the Kenyan polity, but due to systematic exclusion of some ethnic groups from the national leadership, competitive politics in Kenya have been found to have an ethnic dimension and tribal identities. This grounded idealism have constantly explored tribal tension which I think have been part of the consequences of the ethnic violence as Varshney (2001) pointed out that historical reasoning requires that we draw a distinction between proximate and underlying causation. The Kenyan case for example, is a practical case of historical and structural injustices that requires change in engaging complex historical relationships.

In essence, when Kenya became a one-party state in 1969, Kenyatta ruled the country with a clique around him mainly from his ethnic Kikuyu, who eventually alienated other groups from the political and economic order for his entire reign (1963-1978). Although Kenyatta did not instigate ethnic clashes, he targeted eminent persons from other ethnic groups that he felt were a threat to his leadership. History has it that many people were assassinated including Pio Gama Pinto (Kenyan Indian), JM Kariuki (Kikuyu) Tom Mboya, D.O Makasembo, Arwings Kodhek (all Luo) Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda of Coast), Seroney (Kalenjin) among others. Such assassinations generated interethnic tensions rendering country in awkward position of hostility and political tribal identity since Kenyatta’s reign. As Black said that social identities are vulnerable to history, especially to the social enactment over time of important cultural propositions about selves, groups, and the relations between them; what might be called ‘deep politics’. In other words, while Kenyatta during his reign did not settle the indigenous from the Rift Valley, Moi who reigned after him and member of Kalenjin from (1969 – 2002) failed to address historical injustices, economic inequalities, high unemployment rate and uprising of militia groups that seems to target people from different ethnic groups with much support from prominent politicians. A good example is the so called ‘Mungiki’ which began as religious sect but now causing high outrage and threats in the country and in particular recently causing over 35 deaths in a community. As Jeong (2008) pointed out that strategies of suppression are likely to invite such tactics as threats, harassment and the actual physical control of opponents. In the same perspective, during his 24 year reign, Moi exploited the Kenyan diversity and politicized ethnicity to levels where he could instigate clashes in districts and provinces with mixed groups, a practice he perfected in the 90’s in order to discredit the onset of multiparty democracy in Kenya. He politically motivated ethnic clashes which were used to disrupt and displace populations and groups that supported the opposition (mainly the Kikuyu in Rift Valley, Luo in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa, Kiisi’s and Luhyas in western Kenya) that followed with general land clashes of 1992 in Rift valley.

Rooted in the history of nation state building and power politics that has been generated by the leaders, the methodology of non-violence actions contributes a meaningful and necessary tools, particularly the capacity to assess the situation on which set of people can deliver pain or destroy processes. Jeong (2008) expounds that the prelude to conflict is accompanied by the translation of latent conditions, such a discontent stemming from social injustice and growing inequity, into social mobilization which demands changes in the status quo. As a lens it brings into focus people and processes wielding such power. Former president Moi for instance, used divide and rule tactics, pitting on one ethnic against another and at times bought politician through patronage in order to have more support in parliament. These tactics en-sured that that the opposition lost the elections of 1992 and 1997. This went on until 2002, when his constitu-tional terms in office expired that he had no options, but also due to the unity of the opposition through NARC (Rainbow coalition of Kijana Wamalwa FORD- Kenya, Raila Odinga of LDP, Charity Ngilu and Kibaki of NAK/DP) which reflected the diversity and unity of different ethnic groups got together and managed to defeat Moi’s preferred choice of successor. Suddenly, Moi was voted out of office in 2002, and Kibaki became presi-dent. Unfortunately, Kibaki’s leadership has been differ-rent in curbing tribalism and ethnicity. For instance, the appointments on key cabinet ministries, running of business house committee in the parliament, permanent secretaries, civil servants, military, diplomatic commission and other key offices done in ethnic levels. The magnitude of ethnic hatred has widened since Kibaki ascended into power with many people from other communities losing their jobs ethnic ground hence further escalation of interethnic violence. It is within this dimension that the methodologies rooted in advocacy campaign be launched to transform the system in place in dealing candidly with the inherent leadership, inner lives and institutional
reforms. The Stakeholders map in Figure 1 shows the main actors in the advocacy campaign that this article is proposing.

The Analysis of stakeholders’ strategic assessment

Obviously, one’s circle of experience influences what one observe as Sharp (2005) points out that under certain circumstances members of the population will become willing to endure the consequences on non-cooperation and disobedience, including inconvenience, suffering, and disruption of their lives, rather than continue to submit passively or to obey rulers whose policies and actions can no longer be tolerated. In the same manner, many scholars have argued that by using violence to influence the outcome of a conflict it is often very difficult to reverse your actions in case you are wrong. It is easy to acknowledge for any honest person that we from time to time make wrong judgements. If we act violently based on wrong assumptions it is seldom possible to reverse our actions. It is obvious in extreme forms of violence: Killing someone cannot be reversed, but the same goes for many forms of physical or serious psychological violence. Likewise, many argue that violence is too wide-ranging a tool. All persons have a number of “roles” and in most cases it is only one or few of them we have conflicts with. Approaching this campaign non-violently by integrating the ethnic dynamics would be our preferred approach to reforms. The stakeholders in Figure 1 are the main actors in this campaign.

On the far right, are the local communities in conflict with government to relocate peoples from Kikuyu tribes and other ethnic communities to evacuate their land and region. In this perspective of attitude, local communities will resist the reform process since the land gives them sense of security, identity, and independence. The civil society/NGOs on the other hand are strong allies with the local people and partly by the government that stand a better chance to initiate campaign against interethnic violence reforms. The civil society is paramount stakeholder as Varshney (2001) points out that interethnic and intra-ethnic networks of civil engagement play very different roles in ethnic conflict. Because they build bridges and manage tensions, interethnic networks are agents of peace, but if communities are organized only along intra-ethnic lines and the interconnections with communities are very weak even or even nonexistent, then ethnic violence is quite likely. Hence, with clear network and well designed goals, the civil society can rely on the farmers, Local communities, Members of Parliament, Religious groups, and media for grassroots campaign on change of mindset by accepting each other as Kenyan not on ethnic identity.

At the centre is the Kenya Government under the leadership of National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) which some members have been preaching tribal, hatred and inflammatory politics. In the same government, the incumbent
president and some legislature from central province will support the reform since people from their communities are part of the problem in Rift Valley and other parts of Kenya. However, the members of parliament from Rift Valley would definitely resist the reform since they want other tribes vacate their land. In addition, a number of members of parliament from Rift Valley have been quoted severally in the daily press and public calling for evacuation of other ethnic groups. It seems from this perspective that there is high assumption that some members of parliament will resist change and debate on the ethnicity. Besides, the government relies on the judiciary of which many Kenyan have no faith on due to the way system have been handling number of cases and the mode of appointments by the president without consultations. Conversely, they are expected to resist change and reforms. This could also apply to the farmers as Rift Valley is known for its fertility in producing: flowers, maize, wheat, tea and coffee worldwide hence getting rid of other tribes or ethnic groups would create space for their land and agricultural products.

On the far left are Religious groups. These groups are in touch with farmers, local communities, media, civil society, electoral commission, and the electorates. Since people have a lot of trust on the Church groups, they have persuasive force towards inter-ethnic violence reform as they are close to the people. They are not expected to resist change though some pastors have openly been quoted preaching tribal hate speech in the pulpit. This is one of the main reasons ethnic hatred has spread to other tribes or ethnic groups would create space for their land and agricultural products.

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On the top left is the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). The ECK relies entirely on the government for appointments of its commissioners, the Judiciary, Media, partly on the religious leaders and the civil society for the execution of their duties. However, following the nature of appointments commissioners without consultation of other key stakeholders in the coalition government, the ECK have been rated as incompetent and lacked transparency. It is within this perspective that they would resist reform. Nevertheless, in 2002 election Kenyan have a lot of confidence in the ECK on how they conducted the whole process followed by referendum of 2005. Besides, the current approval of newly appointed commissioners with national outlook, the institution stands a better chance for reform in this campaign. On the bottom right is the media. The media in Kenya has strong alliance with the local communities, government, religious leaders, members of parliament, and civil society. The media position them in a better chance as an instrument of reform since many Kenyans have access to either electronic or print media. However, due to liberation of the press media in the local languages: Kameme FM, Kass FM, Ramogi a, some hate speeches by these stations may hinder reforms. But since our or out intended tactics of non-violence is more effective than violence, the only interesting topic in which nonviolent technique is appropriate for campaign reforms from the grassroots is the media. Sharp (2005) describe the presence or absence of strategic calculations and planning, and, if present, their wisdom, will have a major impact on the course of the struggle and on determining its final outcome. This is because most often the roles of individuals in political conflicts have a tendency to be exaggerated.

However, on the power analysis map, the pastoralists and other producers are beneficiaries of illegal land distribution of land. They would be formidable opponents in the struggle for land reform in Kenya. They would use all kinds of tactics including bribery, political connections, intimidations and even threat to lives to protect their interests. Their power depends on their connections to the political establishment. They would depend on the government for protection even if they break the law of the country in the process of protecting their interest and business. They may not be seen in public but they are expected to exert a lot of influence from behind the scenes. The Business class is powerful because they have influential allies in the government who are shareholders in their companies. Furthermore they have their international partners who can also put pressure on the Kenya government to resist any campaign for change to the current land policy. When individuals in central positions are replaced, the systems seem to survive and continue more or less as earlier as shown below in Table 1.

How this relates to theory of change.

According to Sharp (2005) it is not the sanctions themselves that produce obedience, but the fear of them. The inter-ethnic violence reforms very much depend on the government as its power is embedded on the local people. Within this orientation, the government of Kenya depends on the obedience of the people to make the necessary reforms like interethnic violence and land clashes. It is in this view that networks, trade unions, environmental groups, solidarity movements, peace
organisations, and other parts of the civil society non-violent actions can be used regularly to promote ideas and struggle for the root causes of conflicts. Or in other words as renowned scholar Lederach (2005) points out that it took some time, you have to take the risk of following your own intuition, your own voice. It would therefore be imperative to use non-violent actions either to create wider support for our goals, to directly reach our aim or in order to prevent the opponents from achieving theirs. For example, the use of some form of coercion through; boycott of legislative bodies, withholding or withdrawal of allegiance, boycott of elections, refusal to accept appointments of tribal levels, removal of own signs and placements that are on ethnic languages to mention a few.

Non-violent protests are actions of peaceful opposition but not going as far as refusing to cooperate or directly intervene in the situation. The use of symbols, marches, picket-lines and protest meetings are typical examples of non-violent protests that would be used by the civil society, Church groups and some members of community willing for reforms and good neighbourhood. A wide variety of actors are using such techniques on a regular basis. Sharp (2005) points out that in the conflict of farm workers and grapes growers, the methods given greatest weight by the union changed from farm workers strikes, to longer-shore men, truckers, and railwaymen refusing to ship grapes to consumers’ boycott. A frequent goal for non-violent protests is to communicate a message of opposition. It can be seen as a voice against the establishment when the formal political channels do not give them a say in the decision-making. The protests themselves are visual means of communication, but often they are combined with slogans, symbols or catch phrases which explain the message. Protests are normally just one step in a chain of activities which leads to more communications between representatives from the opposition and delegates from those in position. Thousands of protests take place on the local, regional and global arena every day. The civil society and NGOs organization has a huge constituency support and hence when they come together in a non violent way would influence political decisions. Paulson (2005) explains that peoples’ power as the case of the Philippines where the people’s resistance to brutal military regime led to the overthrow and exile of Frederick Marcos. Likewise, the people of Kenya
can stamp their power by voting out the government when elections are called and vote in a government that would implement the inter-ethnic violence reforms policy by transforming proximate, historical, and institutional causes of the ethnic conflict and violence. This would not be easy, but as Lederach (2005) stresses that the artist community, it seems to me, starts with experience in the world and then creates a journey toward expressing something that captures the wholeness of that feeling in a succinct moment. By doing this, people would withdraw their consent of obedience to the government by taking power from them that could lead to lack of legislative moral authority. Unfortunately, the groups like farmers and indigenous people may use all kinds of tactics including bribery, political connections, intimidations and even threat to lives to resist reform. But I think peoples’ power is stronger any force so to say as the case of Philippines that we shall rely on.

**Developing a campaign to address interethnic violence reforms in Kenya**

In order to have a clear picture of the process of developing a campaign for the land reforms in Kenya and inter-ethnic violence reforms, we have to identify the different levels of collaboration and come up with a strategy of campaign process. According to Jeong (2008) the choice of conflict style (avoiding, contending, yielding and accommodating) is likely to be affected by actor motivations and situations. It is especially determined by power relations and the salience of issues from the perspective of each party as well as their will and commitment to conflict. That is to say that, non-cooperation is well known from trade unions and their use of strikes. They have been known to put pressure on their employers by refusing to fulfil their role as producers. These same methods are used by many other actors and in many different contexts. The main idea behind such actions is that political, social or economical power depends on some level of cooperation. These types of power can be influenced by changing the level of cooperation. The level of cooperation is based on several factors. Cooperation may exist because it benefits the involved actors or it can be based on fear of the consequences of refusing to cooperate. The fear is normally based on knowledge about possible forms of punishments. States are well known for threats of penalties like trials, fines, imprisonments, tortures, and death penalty. Other actors can force people to be obedient by threats of social exclusion, withdrawal of support and — as for state actors - physical or psychological punishment. The most frequent reasons for people's cooperation, in addition to the self -benefit, are ignorance and unawareness. The norm is to obey, follow orders and regulations and not behave differently from others. For non-cooperation to take place it is necessary, but not sufficient, to remove, fear, ignorance and obedience in changing peoples’ attitudes, behaviours and goals which forms the core objective of this campaign.

Therefore, non-violent intervention as shall be used is the last of the three categories of non-violent actions. These are actions in which some form of direct involvement from someone who originally was not part in the conflict takes place. Gilligan (2001) explains that we cannot even begin to prevent violence until we acknowledge what we ourselves are doing that contributes to it, actively or passively, and to remember that in a democracy we are all responsible for all. By directly intervening in the reform situations the persons taking part in it are often expose themselves to higher risks and the consequences can be both more immediate and more serious. The interventionists can, depending on their activity, be stakeholders in the conflict. Figure 2 is a representation of the leadership and levels at which would be used for this process of participatory decision making in the campaign for land reform. At the top level of the leadership is the Kenya Bishops’ conference whose blessing is very crucial for the campaign to take off. The paradigms of involving top leaders under the social justice department of the bishops, politicians, judiciary and professionals means that the campaign can make use of all the hierarchical structures to involve all the people at the grassroots and community levels. The top leaders being the representatives of the people and Church leaders’ initiative would reach out to all other faiths and get them to join the campaign. This will make the campaign virtually an all people’s campaign since almost all Kenyans profess one faith or the other for the reforms. By and large, use of participatory approach to the focus group on top level, we shall involve key leaders (Bishops, clergy/pastors, World Council of Churches, community leaders, members of parliament) to involve all people from the grassroots through capacity building so that people own the campaign. As Schirch (2004) points out those key leaders have the authority to make important decisions that can reduce violence and address basic needs. They can use their influence to create a critical mass where so many people embrace their ideas and solutions so that change is inevitable.

The middle class which is very important for this campaign would disseminate information to all stakeholders by means of persuasion and advocacy on a peace-ful co-existence. These include national and regional organizations and business lead policy program initiatives such as providing the regional coordination for relief aid for humanitarian crisis (Schirch, 2004)). Though it is important to recognize that for most conflict there are no strong movements, neither inside nor outside combat zone the strength of any campaign is the grassroots/civil society support. Within the grassroots networks, there is consultation, participation and constant movement that make it easy for the campaign to take root. As Schirch explains that at the grassroots or community level, a variety of local groups carry out relief and development program-mes, civilian peacekeeping, dialogues, trauma healing, training and education programmes, and other projects. This
Table 2. Summation of self assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Social Capital</th>
<th>Prospects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To ensure equal distribution of resources</td>
<td>To promote nation/state institutions</td>
<td>National, regional, NGOs and international</td>
<td>- To build mutual relationships and network with other advocacy agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>To address proximate and historical cases of conflict</td>
<td>To ensure that the government address the politics of exclusion</td>
<td>communities of good will for peaceful co-existence.</td>
<td>- Constitutional reforms that address land issues and tribalism.</td>
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<td>To address manipulation of masses using tribalism</td>
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<td>- Fundamental option for the poor</td>
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Capacities and self assessment

Peace-building has too often taken the challenge of building trust primarily at the technical level, Table 2 as Lederach (2003) states that conflict transformation lenses suggest we look beyond the dishes to see the context of the relationships that is involved, and then look back again at the pile. In line with this, the design shall respect people’s identity, culture, values and existential basic needs in carrying out the campaign logistics. It becomes clear that when identity needs are threatened or not satisfied and worldviews are disrupted by violent acts or structures, the individual or group’s security is at stake. In extreme cases, their very lives are threatened. (Paradoxically, the fear of losing one’s identity is sometimes greater than the fear of losing one’s life.) There is little doubt that these fears and threats, real or perceived, will cause high stress or traumatic responses. The responses are freeze, flight and fight, all of which reflect “normal” reaction to the need to protect life and the values and cultural factors that give meaning to it.

In particular as peace-building practitioners, apathy and non-violent actions would be the backbone strengths in understanding the root causes of problems without
condoning the people’s attitudes and behaviours. As VeneKlasen (2002) explores that we get in advocacy because we want to improve society and influence the course of history, hence self-analysis helps to identify our strengths and weakness and clarity in a group. Therefore, self-assessment aim is to show strength, unity, and power. Most of these cases have an element of external support of some sort which I think we would get from the other NGOs/civil societies and international communities that are reform oriented. For example, this would be done informing political and/or moral support for the opposition or it could be practical help in organising, training, and accomplishment of the protests. One of the most debated forms of assistance is the financial support and transfers from foreign states or foundations to local opposition groups which to an extent become a major challenge in monitoring the sustainability of the reform process due to its completion.

I think therefore, that social and effective change can transform the structural violence for a desirable outcome non-violently. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa a similar wave of massive non-violent actions removed the old regimes in country after country. The opposition in Benin had been growing for a long time and drew further inspiration from the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. With the break-up of Soviet Union in 1991 several of the francophone countries saw the possibility to follow the path from Benin. The student movement in China 1989 and the bicentennial of the French revolution gave extra energy to new movements. Non-violent and relatively well organised oppositions forced the former Marxist regimes to open up for more pluralistic political systems. In countries like Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, and Malawi similar waves of democratisation as in Benin followed. And the most well known case, South Africa, got rid of the apartheid system after a long and mainly non-violent struggle in 1994. Certainly, in practical terms, for deeply divided society like Kenya for example requires the capacity to imagine a relationship with the other that transcends cycle of violence while the other patterns of violence are still present. This is embedded on centrality of relationships for those who like change or not but focusing beyond the immediate situation by taking risk to the unknown world of change.

Advocacy goals, tactics, time, and targeted audience to address the conflict – SMART

According VeneKlasen (2002) long term goals are more abstract and tend to not change much over time while short term goals and objectives are always refined. Meanwhile, the long list of successful non-violent political revolutions all has one problematic consequence: They have been more successful removing a regime than replacing it with something better. However, only a few of them have had a well prepared strategy for building a new and better society when the old one falls. But for this reform to take place therefore, structural and cultural changes must be transformed to achieve the end result. Consequently, the objective of this campaign is to ensure equal distribution of resources by addressing both the proximate and historical causes for the inter-ethnic violence in Kenya. This may take a period of 3 – 5 years depending on the magnitude of the conflict and community response. However, following specific objectives of this campaign, gives focus on what to be accomplished as abovementioned. In particular, apart from being specific, it is also measurable following the time period and effective of the campaign in collaboration with the key stakeholders. Besides, it is also measurable as stipulated in the vision and mission of the campaign reform frameworks. And finally, I think that this strategic reform is realistic and time bound following the nature and content of inter-ethnic violence in Kenya that need immediate attention. Hence, basing on the context, content and process, the time frame is appropriate to analyse the conflict and come up with effective reform design.

The Primary and Secondary Audience

The primary audience as already mentioned are the Government, Members of parliament, Ethnic communities, Religious groups, and the local communities. They would engage the government to influence in decision making process, policy making and enforce changes for campaign that would have impact on the entire community from the grassroots.

The secondary audience includes: Civil society/NGOs, Media, Electoral Commission, and Judiciary. Through the pressure from civil society and religious groups, we hope to achieve amicable solution at the end of this campaign. The media for sure would transmit the information to every community via electronic or printed media that definitely could contribute to the success of campaign on the reform process. Media is currently a very powerful tool when it comes to campaign on positive reforms.

Specific tactics that will help to mobilize or create power and/or raise awareness of the issues

According Jeong (2008) tactics are regarded as specific observable actions that move a conflict in a particular direction in line with strategy. In the same manner, in order to enforce the campaign, the following tactics would be used. First, Formal Statements: Public speeches, Letters of opposition or support, Declarations by organisations and institutions, signed public declarations, Declarations of indictment and intention, and Group or mass petitions.

Secondly, is the Communications with a wider audience: Slogans, caricatures, symbols, banners, posters, and displayed communications, Leaflets, pamphlets, books, newspapers and journals, Records, radio, and television, Skywriting and earth-writing. The aim of all
these are to educate and empower community to take initiative on reforms process by themselves especially when it is difficult to meet face-face with policy makers. Another tactic is the use of symbolic public acts: Sharp (2005) Displays of flags and symbolic colours, Wearing of symbols, Prayer and worship, Delivering symbolic objects, Protest disrobing, Destruction of own property, Symbolic lights, Displays of portraits, Paint as protest, New signs and names, Symbolic sounds, Symbolic reclamation, Rude gestures as symbolic gesture common identity for pro-campaign agents.

Furthermore, tactics such as drama and music, humorous, skits and pranks, performances of plays and music, and singing are good techniques of reform campaign. This would go in line with processions: Marches, Parades, Religious processions, Pilgrimages, Motorcades. Such events and gathering usually influence people’s behaviours to change for reform and good gathering for passing information. However, if these tactics fail to enforce the required changes, then following strategies could be used: Action by Consumers - Consumers’ boycott, Non-consumption of boycotted goods, Policy of austerity, rent withholding, Refusal to rent, National consumers’ boycott, and International consumers’ boycott. Similarly, action by workers and producers, Workers’ boycott, Producers’ boycott, action by middlemen Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott could motivate the spirit of change for reform campaign. Another option in case all these tactics fail is to mobilize the citizens’ alternatives to obedience by show of: slow compliance, non-observance in absence of direct supervision, popular non-observance, disguised disobedience, refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse, sit-down, non-cooperation with conscription and deportation, hiding, escape, false identities, and civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws to advocates inter-ethnic violence reforms whatsoever.

Strategy to increase the will and power of the defence and undermine the will and power of the aggressors or opponents goals on issues

Druckman (2003) points out three aspects of the situation had strong effects on the process: the thinking of smaller to larger political issues, time pressure, and external event. Conversely, we expect some kind of aggression and resistance from some key stakeholders that are not willing to embrace reform agenda to retain their status quo and political power base. For example, some members of parliament in the government from contested Rift Valley will definitely resist reform as they want other tribes out. This could also apply to farmers, local community and business fraternity who have been the beneficiary of the land since independence from the colonies. However, our strategy despite the resistance from key stakeholders would be to empower members of the community through capacity building, civic education awareness, creating sense of community and cohesion among different ethnic groups, conducting seminars and workshops to popularize on the importance of peaceful co-existence and making people aware of their rights and obligations. Such strategies I believe will create space for dialogue which is the key feature of some of the most important political processes in today’s world; namely, efforts to prevent or bring about an end to armed conflicts and ethnic violence as the case of Kenya.

This may not be easy in some situation as Broome (2006) points out that not infrequently the development of the conflict follows a pattern whereby periods of relative “peace” (or, more accurately, a truce) alternate with periods of open confrontation. Concerned communities are trapped in a vicious cycle, seemingly with no end in sight. This is to say that political and social transformations are not enough: in addition there must be an inner revolution within each individual quest for change and reforms willingness. Many, although not all, of those committed to reforms or a non-violent lifestyle also tends to be engaged in non-violent actions of different sorts. They include in their lifestyle a societal engagement and takes part in civil society activities against what they regard as unjust, immoral or simply wrong policies and decisions. As for Gandhi, philosophy was not enough. His vision was to develop and build a whole lifestyle based on non-violent principles. He used the terms “Non-violence for the Weak” about the pragmatic use of non-violent techniques and “Non-violence of the Strong” for those who committed themselves to a non-violent lifestyle. That lifestyle was a totality of self discipline, undemanding lifestyle, an inner search for truth, the use of non-cooperation against unjust laws and decisions, constructive work and civil courage to confront the opponent. The Gandhi philosophy would be our guiding principle in developing a campaign momentum to reach everybody with consistency at all levels without use of force or violence.

How strategy is in line with the development models

According to VeneKlasen (2002) strategy must take into consideration; context, timing, organization, and risk of the advocacy campaign. As for the context of the advocacy campaign on interethnic violence reform to take shape, the nature of the interethnic tensions, political, social-economic, cultural, identity, religion, common values and existential needs must be addressed. The campaign would underscore these issues by involving the local communities, middle leaders and the top leaders. The reason being non-violence has its roots in those parts of the society which has fought with peaceful means for freedom, democracy and respect for human rights. These issues are used by stakeholders to in-luence a conflict situation. In this campaign therefore, we adopts different non-violent strategies and techniques and use them in the struggle against inhuman ideologies, policies, systems, decisions, and laws. The choice of means would be more based on what is effective than of
Ethnic tensions → Peaceful Co-existence

Solutions to Interethnic Violence:
Dialogue and negotiation before, during and after violence on the contradicting goals and issues from the grassroots could lead to sustainable peaceful co-existence among communities.

Figure 3. Level of Collaboration.

Ethical guidelines and moral values. Even if we can trace their history back further, it is fair to say that some of these issues have developed and been main causes of violence between various ethnic groups in Kenya. Therefore, the majority of non-violent activists for advocacy campaign belonging some place in the middle, but closer to “not killing” than “perfect harmony”, which we can refer to as aikido. As a peace-building practitioner henceforth, I must know myself, be prepared and be ready to transform the situation as a way of measuring the success of non-violent campaign strategy.

Again VeneKlasen explains that timing is an important factor in advocacy and campaign and development. This is because each historical moment presents different political opportunities and constraints. Cooperation and inspiration now becomes the main common factors in this case to plan within time frame. For example, the first case in this wave is Solidarity in Poland. After two centuries of armed uprising the Polish workers in 1980 tried to fight the regime with non-armed means and they formed the independent trade movement Solidarity. The Catholic Church and the Polish pope played a crucial role in inspiring and giving courage to individuals in the years ahead. The visit by the Pope to Poland in June 1979 mobilised some of the largest gatherings in Poland ever. None was in doubt about the Pope’s view on communism. Solidarity is noted for its use of symbols in their struggle. Not only their flag and the Catholic cross, but a number of monuments, historic dates and well known persons were used to express their views in times of censorship. This kind of conflict existed in a set of issues or events that persisted to be important over time. However, the solution was reached and parties accepted change of leadership. We shall apply the same approach if the government becomes adamant on the reform process. A good example from Tidwell (1998) that no matter whether one takes an objectivist or subjectivist view of conflict, time plays important role in conflict. So then, time frame set for this campaign of 3 – 5 years hopefully would produce positive results for effective reform.

Peace-building framework

Conflicts and interethnic violence over access to land in Kenya have been around for a long time (Southall, 2005), but they have never gone beyond the stage of confrontation. One of such land conflict was in 1992. The government’s response to the conflict was set up a commission to investigate the causes of the conflict. Unfortunately, the findings have never been made public. The recent crisis over the elections results as already mentioned escalated because of the historical injustice of over land. The main pre-occupation of the politicians is about power sharing and maintaining that power. The non-violent advocacy campaign would however keep a sustained pressure on the government until its joins the national dialogue and negotiation for land reform in Kenya. The models of peace-building framework in Figure 3 would push the conflict from its latent in stage 1 and take to a non-violent confrontation in stage 2. And through the national dialogue and negotiation would lead to a sustainable peace in stage 4. Reaching a sustainable peace is the destiny of this campaign awareness and peace-building in Kenya and other countries faced with the same conflicts.
Conclusion

Although there would never be anyone who can match Gandhi's approach to non-violent action, however, there are absolutely many who can follow the same path and do “experiments with the truth”. Kenya has been known to be a peace loving country despite the historical, institutional, cultural, structural injustices that has widely contributed to ethnic violence. I believe by using this Peace building framework model with artistic creativity and empathy, a new web of relationships tools can be developed in this campaign to reform peoples mind set and make an impact on how people relate to each other. Kenyans have always shown that they are peace loving people and henceforth if transformation of institutions of governance, equal distribution of resources, ethnic influence to power, disappearance of democracy, constitutionalism, politics of exclusion, weak states/fragile nations and historical grievances could be addressed, then, the reality of peaceful co-existence is not far from being realized.

However, in order to be successful, there is need for all stakeholders to change their attitudes and behaviours towards each individual in terms of relationships, power dominion and worldviews. Most important, though centrality of building relationships, curiosity, on what people think, imagination by thinking beyond the pie and tribe, and taking risk by stepping to unknown to look back, present and the future in explaining one’s story of what happened. If these are done sufficiently during the campaign for inter-ethnic reform, then peaceful co-existence would be achieved without doubt. Worth noting is that the “total revolution” as in the Gandhian tradition includes changing the political power, the social structure and the inner transformation of each individual that waves of non-violent revolutions presented above is what is needed for a non-violent society to materialize for different forms of ethnic, racial and genocide widely experience in today’s society.

REFERENCES